Many countries use substantial public funds to subsidize reductions in negative externalities. However, such subsidies create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. This paper examines implications of such asymmetric subsidy incentives by using a regression discontinuity design in California's electricity rebate program that provided a financial reward for energy conservation. Using household-level panel data from administrative records, I find precisely-estimated zero causal effects in coastal areas. In contrast, the incentive produced a 5% consumption reduction in inland areas. Income and climate conditions significantly drive the heterogeneity. Asymmetric subsidy structures weaken incentives because consumers far from the rebate target show little response. The overall program cost is 17.5 cents per kWh reduction and $390 per ton of carbon dioxide reduction, which is unlikely to be cost-effective for a reasonable range of the social marginal cost of electricity.
Introduction
In economic theory, negative externalities can be corrected by Pigouvian taxes that internalize external costs (Pigou, 1924) . However, opposition from taxpayers generally makes it difficult to implement such taxes. As an alternative, many countries use substantial public funds to subsidize economic activities that presumably result in reductions in negative externalities. For example, while many countries have failed to introduce a carbon tax on greenhouse gas emissions, they spend substantial public funds to reward energy conservation and pollution abatement.
1 Likewise, regulators often provide subsidies for smoking cessation and alternative transportation rather than introduce high taxes on smoking and congestion.
2 However, such subsidies create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. This asymmetry introduces two inherent problems. First, the subsidies may not be able to correct all externalities if the marginal decisions of many individuals are not affected by the subsidy incentive. This contrasts with Pigouvian taxes, which equalize the private and social marginal costs for all individuals. Second, the subsidies introduce an "additionality" problem (Joskow and Marron, 1992) . Some of the observed behavior are not "additional" if they would occur in the absence of the subsidy incentive. Therefore, it is misleading to evaluate the causal effect of such subsidies by simply analyzing those who received a subsidy, although many previous studies take this approach.
3
In this paper, I investigate these problems by applying a regression discontinuity (RD) design to a large-scale electricity rebate program in California. In the summer of 2005, California residents received a 20% discount on their electricity bills if they could reduce their 1 In the US, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided $17 billion for energy conservation programs. US electric utilities spent $26 billion dollars on energy efficiency programs in 1994-2011, and the annual spending has been continuously increasing since 2003 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013) 2 Many countries provide subsidies for energy-efficient appliances (Davis, Fuchs and Gertler, 2012; Boomhower and Davis, 2013) , energy-efficient vehicles (Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2011; Sallee, 2011; Mian and Sufi, 2012; Sallee and Slemrod, 2012) , reductions in energy consumption (Reiss and White, 2008; Wolak, 2010; Borenstein, 2013) . Carbon offset programs such as the clean development mechanism (CDM) by the United Nations give firms credits if they reduce their pollution relative to a business-as-usual baseline level (Sutter and Parreño, 2007; Schneider, 2007; Duflo et al., Forthcoming) . Financial incentives for smoking cessation is becoming a key policy instrument (Volpp et al., 2009 ). Congestion pricing is still rarely implemented in the US highway system and the federal and state government use substantial public funds to subsidize public transit to address congestion (Anderson, 2013) .
3 Joskow and Marron (1992) argue that many policy evaluations of utility conservation programs fail to take account of the the additionality problem. Boomhower and Davis (2013) studies how this problem affects the cost-effectiveness of an energy-efficient appliance subsidy program in Mexico. Second, all eligible households automatically participated in the program, which prevents the self-selection problem that is a major challenge in previous studies.
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My analysis is based on the administrative data on household-level monthly electricity billing records from the electric utilities that administered the rebate program. Compared to survey data, the full administrative billing records have advantages in its accuracy in the measurement and its comprehensive coverage of consumers. The data also include each customer's nine-digit zip code, with which I match demographic and weather data to investigate potential heterogeneity in response to the subsidy incentive.
Using the discontinuity in treatment assignment, I apply a sharp RD design to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE). I find that the rebate incentive reduced electricity consumption by 4% to 5% in inland areas in California, where the summer temperature is persistently high and the income level is relatively low. In contrast, I find precisely estimated zero treatment effects in coastal areas in California, where the summer temperature is moderate and the income level is relatively high. To explore what drives the heterogeneity in the treatment effect, I estimate the interaction effects between the treatment variable and climate conditions and those between the treatment variable and income levels. Results from the regressions suggest that the treatment effect increases by a 0.15 percentage point as the average temperature increases by 1 degree Fahrenheit and decreases by a 0.029 percentage point as income levels increase by 1%.
The asymmetric subsidy structure creates the possibility that the response to the subsidy differs between consumers whose consumption is close to the target level of consumption and consumers whose consumption is far from the target. To test whether the asymmetric incentive creates a "giving-up" effect for consumers far from the target level, I estimate the quantile treatment effects on the changes in consumption. I find evidence that most of the treatment effects come from consumers who are closer to the target level of consumption, and that the treatment effect is not significantly different from zero for consumers who are far from the target level. This finding provides evidence that the asymmetry in the subsidy schedule weakens the incentive for conservation compared to a simple Pigouvian tax.
In general, regression discontinuity designs require relatively weak identification assumptions to estimate local average treatment effects (LATE). However, a disadvantage is that it gives LATE instead of average treatment effects (ATE) (Angrist and Rokkanen, 2012) .
In my research design, the RD estimates come from households that opened their account about a year before the beginning of the treatment period. An important question is whether the treatment effect is different between my RD samples and households that opened their account earlier.
To address this point, I propose a method that combines the RD design with differencein-difference-in-differences (DDD). This method estimates the ATE with an additional identification assumption. In general, residential electricity consumers have a small positive trend in their electricity consumption after they open their accounts. This trend is translated into a small trend in my running variable for the RD design. To estimate the ATE, I assume that the positive trend in consumption is the same between households that opened their accounts on a certain date and those that opened their account on the same day in the previous year. With this assumption, I can difference out the small positive trend from my RD design and estimate the ATE. I use this method to estimate the ATE for consumers who opened their account 90 days, 180 days, one year, two years, three years, and four years before the eligibility cutoff date. I find that the difference between the ATE and the LATE is small and not statistically different. This finding suggests that the RD estimates are not significantly different from the treatment effects for consumers who opened their accounts earlier than my RD sample.
The findings of this paper provide several important policy implications. First, asymmetric incentives created by subsidy programs are likely to weaken incentives to reduce negative externalities. The evidence of zero treatment effect in coastal areas is consistent with the theoretical prediction that consumers do not respond to the asymmetric incentive at all if the price elasticity is below a cutoff level. Second, the difference between my RD estimates and naive estimates of the treatment effect shows that the additionality problem is a central concern in evaluations of subsidy programs (Joskow and Marron, 1992; Boomhower and Davis, 2013) . While my RD estimates show precisely-estimated zero causal effects in coastal areas, naive estimates that ignore the additionality problem indicate that a significant number of consumers responded to the incentive. This result provides evidence that careful empirical analysis is critical for evaluations of energy conservation programs (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012) . It is particularly important for recent US energy policy because public spending for energy conservation programs has been growing rapidly. For example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided $17 billion for energy conservation programs.
US electric utilities spent $26 billion dollars on energy efficiency programs in 1994-2011, and the annual spending has been continuously increasing since 2003 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2013). Finally, I provide cost-effective analysis. The overall program cost is 17.5 cents per kWh reduction and $390 per ton of carbon dioxide reduction, which is unlikely to be cost-effective for a reasonable range of the social marginal cost of electricity.
Conceptual Framework

Asymmetric Incentive Structures of Conservation Subsidies
In this section, I use a simple framework to characterize theoretical predictions of consumer behavior in the presence of conservation subsides. Suppose that consumers have quasilinear utility functions u(y i , n i ) = v(y i ) + n i for electricity consumption y i and a numeraire consumption good n i . Consumers with income I i and electricity price p maximize v(y i ) + I i − py i and consume y 0 , where v (y 0 ) = p.
Suppose that regulators consider that electricity price p does not properly reflect the social marginal cost of electricity. For example, p may not reflect the environmental externalities from electricity generation, or p may not reflect the higher marginal cost of supplying electricity when the system faces a supply shortage. The first-best solution is to increase the price by the cost of the externalities τ . That is, increasing the electricity price by τ lets consumers choose y * , where v (y * ) = p + τ .
However, regulators often prefer implementing conservation subsidies instead of introducing a price change. In conservation subsidy programs, regulators first determine "rebate baseline consumption" b i , which is usually a function of consumer i's past consumption level.
Then, they offer a subsidy schedule that is based on b i and y i . For example, figure 1 illustrates the subsidy schedule of the California 20/20 rebate program. Consumers receive a 20% discount on their summer electricity bills if they consume 20% less than their baseline, which is their consumption in the previous year's summer months. This subsidy creates a notch in the budget constraint because it changes both marginal and infra-marginal prices if consumers reach 80% of their baseline. In another type of conservation subsidy program, consumers receive a marginal subsidy for each unit of conservation relative to a certain baseline level. Examples of this type of subsidy schedule include peak-time rebate programs in dynamic pricing (Wolak, 2006 (Wolak, , 2011 Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Borenstein, 2013) . In these cases, the subsidy schedule creates a kink at the baseline rather than a notch. In both cases, consumers receive a subsidy for reducing consumption, but do not receive a penalty for increasing consumption. This asymmetry creates important differences between such conservation subsidies and the first-best solution.
An inherent feature of such a subsidy schedule is that it creates asymmetry in the incentive to change consumption. In the case with the first-best solution, consumers have a simple price increase of τ , which gives all consumers the same change in marginal incentive irrespective of where they fall in the budget constraint in Figure 1 . In contrast, the introduction of conservation subsidies creates different incentives for consumers, depending on 1) where they fall in the budget constraint, 2) how price-elastic they are, and 3) how much uncertainty in consumption they have. 
Theoretical Predictions of Consumer Behavior
I begin with a simple case with two assumptions that may not be realistic in practice: (a) consumers have no uncertainty in consumption, and (b) their baseline b i is set reasonably close to y 0 , which is their optimal consumption in the absence of the subsidy incentive.
First, consumers do not respond to the subsidy incentive at all if the price elasticity in absolute value is smaller than a certain cutoff level. To illustrate this point, suppose that consumers have a quasi-linear and iso-elastic utility function, u(
1+1/e +n i , where α i is a heterogeneous taste parameter and e ≤ 0 is a constant price elasticity. In Figure 1 Accordingly, all consumers reduce consumption based on the new slope.
Second, given assumptions (a) and (b), there should be bunching of consumers if the price elasticity is larger than |e B | in absolute value. In Figure 1 , all indifference curves that have larger price elasticities than |e B | would have the optimal consumption at the notch point in the presence of the subsidy incentive.
However, in reality, assumptions (a) and (b) are unlikely to hold in residential electricity demand. Let me begin with assumption (a). Electricity consumers have significant uncertainty for their monthly electricity consumption. When consumers face this uncertainty, rational consumers do not respond to the exact nonlinear budget constraint (Saez, 1999; Borenstein, 2009; Ito, Forthcoming) . Instead, they incorporate the uncertainty and respond to the expected price schedule, which is presented as the smoothed dotted line in Figure   1 . The response to the smoothed schedule changes the first and second predictions above.
First, the cutoff level of the price elasticity has to be even larger than the standard case with no uncertainty. In the previous example, consumers who have price elasticity e B no longer respond to the subsidy incentive. Second, because the smoothed schedule no longer has a notch, there can be no bunching of consumers even if the price elasticity is nonzero.
Finally, the subsidy's incentive can be further weakened if rebate baseline b i is set far below y 0 i , which is consumer i's optimal consumption in the absence of subsidy incentive. Conservation subsidy programs usually do not adjust b i for changes in weather or idiosyncratic shocks to each consumer. As a result, if the base year's weather is more moderate than the target year's weather, consumers are more likely to have harder baselines to reach. Furthermore, when consumers experience other negative shocks in consumption in the base year, their baselines become harder to reach. This endogenous baseline (Wolak, 2010; Borenstein, 2013) can introduce a "giving-up effect" because consumers far above the baseline consider the subsidy to be out of reach. Conversely, when consumers have the opposite direction of shocks in consumption, b i can be closer to y 0 i . In this case, consumers who would not respond to the subsidy reduce consumption less than 20% because now they are closer to the cutoff point. That is, the endogenous baseline makes the marginal incentive depend on where the baseline falls in the budget constraint. These predictions contrast with the prediction for the first-best solution, which produces the same marginal incentive for all consumers.
In the following sections, I empirically test these theoretical predictions by applying a regression discontinuity design to the California 20/20 rebate program. In the next section, I describe the research design and data for my empirical analysis.
Research Design and Data
This section provides the institutional background and research design of this study. First, I provide a brief history of the California 20/20 electricity rebate program. Second, I discuss the evidence and challenges in the existing studies. Finally, I describe how I address these challenges by the regression discontinuity design that exploits a sharp discontinuity in treatment assignment. Goldman, Barbose and Eto (2002) find that about 33% of consumers received a rebate.
California 20/20 Electricity Rebate Programs
Although the CPUC aimed for a substantial reduction in electricity consumption 7 , the effectiveness of the program was highly controversial. Proponents of the program have argued 6 By August of 2000, wholesale energy prices had more than tripled from the end of 1999, which caused price spikes in retail electricity rates, and financial losses to electric utilities in California. Many cost factors and demand shocks contributed to this rise, but several studies have also found the market power of suppliers to be significant throughout this period (Joskow, 2001; Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; Borenstein, 2002) .
7 For example, in the executive order, CPUC (2001) estimated that the program would help reduce energy consumption by up to 3,500 gigawatt hours in total and up to 2,200 megawatt hours during critical summer peak consumption periods.
that the simplicity of the program makes it straightforward for customers to understand the incentive and will likely encourage energy conservation. The rebate program also has been more politically appealing than alternative pricing policies such as an increase in electricity price or the introduction of dynamic pricing. In contrast to these alternative policies, the rebate program does not make customers feel that they bear a large economic burden even though the program is paid for by ratepayers as an increase in electricity price.
Opponents of the program have questioned its fairness and effectiveness. For example, Faruqui and George (2006) note that while the program is politically popular, it is unlikely to be effective for energy conservation. One concern is that the program does not incorporate weather differences between the base year and the target year. Therefore, if the target year is cooler than the base year, many households may receive a rebate simply because of the weather difference. The second concern is that even if there is no significant weather difference between the two years, many customers will receive a rebate because of random fluctuations in their electricity consumption. For example, customers that had a friend visit in the base year or customers that traveled in the target year can reduce their target year's consumption by 20% over their base year without conservation efforts. Table 2 In contrast, the summer of 2000 was warmer than 1999. As a result, the median household increased consumption by 7.7%. However, even in this case, 6.8% of households reduced consumption by 20% or more. Thus, random fluctuations in household electricity consumption create necessary costs for this rebate program. This issue sometimes leads to a concern about fairness because the program could induce a simple income transfer from one household to others unrelated to their conservation efforts. Moreover, if the rebate expense for these random fluctuations exceeds the program's actual benefit, the cost-effectiveness of the program can be lower than previous estimates.
Challenges in Estimating the Treatment Effect
To examine the cost-effectiveness of the program, we need a reliable estimate of the treatment effect that is produced solely by the program incentive. The estimation of this treatment effect is, however, generally challenging with non-experimental data. Obviously, it is misleading to draw a conclusion simply by looking at the total consumption reduction achieved by the customers that received a rebate. Some of the rebated customers received a rebate not because of their conservation effort. On the other hand, some un-rebated customers may have responded to the program incentive but failed to reach the 20% reduction cutoff to receive a rebate. Therefore, comparing rebated and un-rebated customers does not provide much information about the program's treatment effect. The second challenge is how to control for potential differences between the base and target years that are unrelated to the program but affected electricity consumption. For instance, differences in weather and economic conditions likely affect electricity consumption in the two years. Therefore, changes in electricity consumption between the two years include the program's treatment effect and other confounding factors that are unrelated to the program, and these two effects must be disentangled by researchers to find the treatment effect.
Previous studies acknowledge that it is difficult to estimate the causal effect of the program. Goldman, Barbose and Eto (2002) Reiss and White (2008) estimate the treatment effect by using household-level billing data for 70,000 households in SDG&E. The study explores how household-level electricity consumption changes from the years before the California electricity crisis in 2001 to the years after the crisis. Based on the average within-household consumption changes relative to the same month during pre-crisis years, they conclude that the rebate program lowers consumption by approximately 4% to 6%. However, they also note that it is difficult to conclude that this estimate solely reflects the program's treatment effect because there were other conservation programs and public appeals in this period. A fundamental challenge in these previous studies is that there is no control group. In the absence of control group, it is difficult to disentangle the causal effect of the program from confounding factors. For example, researchers have to control for changes in weather, electricity price, and macroeconomic shocks between the base and target years. Moreover, Reiss and White (2008) and Goldman, Barbose and Eto (2002) note that it is even more challenging to control for the effect of other conservation programs that are in effect during the study period. In the next section, I describe how I address these challenges by using a regression discontinuity design for the 2005 rebate program. Second, all eligible customers automatically participated in the program, which prevents the self-selection problem that is a major challenge in previous studies. Finally, the electric utilities that administered the program strictly enforced these rules without exception.
This quasi-experimental environment provides the following advantages. The discontinuous eligibility rule generated essentially random assignment of the program among households who started their account near the cutoff date. For example, customers that started their electricity service right before the cutoff date and right after the cutoff date are likely to have similar underlying properties for their electricity consumption, but they were assigned into different groups in terms of the treatment assignment of the rebate program. Even if there is a concern that the underlying properties might be correlated with their service start date, a regression discontinuity design (RDD) can eliminate the bias as long as the correlation between unobservable factors of electricity consumption and service start dates is continuous around the cutoff date for the rebate program.
Data
The primary data for this study consist of a panel data set of household-level monthly The billing data do not include customers' exact address or demographic information.
To obtain demographic information, I match each customer's nine-digit zip code to a census block group in the 2000 US Census data. In addition, I collect daily weather data from the Cooperative Station Dataset published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) National Climate Data Center (NCDC). 9 The data set includes daily minimum and maximum temperature for 370 weather stations in California. I match households' zip codes with the nearest weather station by following the matching mechanism in (Aroonruengsawat and Auffhammer, 2011; Chong, 2012) .
Empirical Analysis and Results
In this section, I first use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the program's local average treatment effect (LATE). Second, I examine heterogeneity in the treatment effects by investing how income and weather affect the treatment. Third, I estimate whether the 9 I thank Anin Aroonruengsawat, Maximilian Auffhammer, and Howard Chong for sharing the data.
nonlinearity in the subsidy schedule induces a "giving-up" effect for consumers who are far from the 20% target level. Fourth, an important question raised from the RD design is whether the treatment effects are different from my RD samples and overall population. In the final part of this section, I propose a way to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE)
by using the RD design with the difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) method.
A Regression Discontinuity Design to Estimate LATE
Consider household i's electricity consumption y it for billing month t before and during the California 20/20 program period. Let D i = 1{i ∈ treatment group}, D t = 1{t ∈ treatment period},
If the treatment status D i is randomly assigned, one can obtain a consistent estimate of the program's average treatment effect (ATE) by estimating the fixed effect estimation,
by the ordinary least squares (OLS), where θ i is household fixed effects, λ t is time fixed 
This sharp RD design produces a consistent estimate of the program's local average treatment
That is, the identification assumption is that the error term has to be uncorrelated with the treatment conditional on a flexible continuous control function f (x i ) · D t and other covariates.
Household fixed effects absorb time-invariant effects of x i on lny it . Therefore, potential confounding factors that I need to control for are the time-varying effects of x i on lny it . Con-sider the demeaned consumption lny it = lny it −θ i . In residential electricity consumption data in general, the plot of lny it against x i produces a nearly flat yet very slightly upward-sloping relationship. This upward-sloping relation comes from the fact that households tend to in- 
Testing the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design
A threat to the validity of RD designs is that the identification assumption is violated if there is self-selection at the cutoff, although this is unlikely to be the case for my research the mean over the 15-day bandwidth, the local linear fit, and its 95% confidence intervals.
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None of the three variables show a statistically significant discrete jump at the cutoff date.
RD Estimates of the Effect of the Conservation Subsidy
In RD estimation, graphical analyses are an important part of quantifying the magnitudes of treatment effects as well as testing the validity of the identification strategy. The nature of regression discontinuity design suggests that the effect of the treatment of interest can be measured by the value of the discontinuity in the expected value of the outcome at a particular point (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) . Therefore, inspecting the estimated version of this conditional expectation is a simple yet powerful way to visualize the identification strategy. Second, Panel B shows evidence that the rebate incentive had a significant effect on electricity consumption in the inland climate zones. There is a clear discontinuous change in consumption between the treatment and control groups at the cutoff point. Visually, the treatment group's consumption is about 5% less than the control group's consumption. In contrast, Panel A suggests that the rebate incentive did not significantly change consumption in the coastal climate zones. There is no discontinuous change in consumption between the treatment and control groups at the cutoff point. 
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In coastal climate zones, the treatment effects are essentially zero with tight standard errors. Because of the tightly estimated point estimates, the 95% confidence intervals do not include 1% treatment effects, suggesting that the program did not have a significant effect on households in coastal climate zones. In contrast, the subsidy incentive had a significant effect on electricity consumption in the inland climate zones. The overall treatment effect is about 4% and the treatment effect of each month ranges from 4% to 5%.
Because I have data for several months before the treatment period, a useful robustness check is to produce the RD estimates for billing months before the treatment period, which I examine to determine whether there is a discrete difference in the outcome variable between the treatment and control groups. Figure 6 presents the RD estimates of the difference in 11 In fact, ignoring the serial correlation produces very small standard errors.
log consumption between the treatment and control groups for the January 2005 through
October 2005 billing months. In the coastal climate zones, the RD estimates are essentially zero both before and during the treatment period. In inland climate zones, the RD estimates are not statistically significant from zero before the treatment period. In contrast, the estimates during the treatment period suggest that the households in the treatment group reduced their consumption by about 5%. This figure provides evidence that the reduction in consumption is unlikely to come from factors unrelated to the program.
Another important robustness check is to examine how the choice of bandwidths and the method to control for f t (x i ) affects the estimates. In Table 4 Another significant difference between inland and coastal California is their demographic characteristics. For instance, income levels tend to be higher in coastal areas than inland areas. In previous studies on residential electricity demand, many studies find slightly larger price elasticity estimates for low income households (Reiss and White, 2005) . Because the 20/20 rebate program is essentially a price-discount rebate program, lower-income households may be more likely to respond to the incentive if their price elasticity is larger than that of higher-income households.
To examine how climate conditions and income levels affect the program's treatment effects, I pool data from all climate zones and estimate the interaction effects. 
Nonlinearity in the Subsidy Schedule
A theoretical prediction in Section 2 implies that the nonlinearity in the subsidy schedule may induce a "giving-up" effect. Even if a consumer has a large price elasticity, the consumer may not respond to the incentive at all if she is far from the cutoff point of the 20% reduction in consumption. This implies that the treatment effect may not come from all consumers equally.
Consider ∆lny it , the change in log consumption from 2004 to 2005. If there is the givingup effect, I expect that the different parts of the distribution of ∆lny it to have different treatment effects. In particular, I would expects no change in consumption for higher percentiles in the distribution, because the treatment intervention is likely to have no effect on these percentiles if there is the giving-up effect.
To test the prediction, I estimate the quantile treatment effects in my RD design (Frandsen, Frölich and Melly, 2012) :
where
Note that this is a quantile regression on the changes in consumption. It estimates how the treatment intervention changes the distribution of the changes in consumption. I estimate the equation for the changes in consumption for August and September for households in inland climate zones. Table 6 presents the quantile treatment effects for the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th percentiles. The treatment effect is larger for the lower tails of the distribution of the change in consumption. On the other hand, the treatment effect is not statistically significant from zero in the median and the higher tails of the distribution. This suggests evidence that the treatment effect mostly comes from the lower tail of the distribution. It also suggests that households that happen to be relatively far from the 20% reduction target are likely to give up and do not respond to the incentive. In theory, the rebate incentive can increase consumption in the left tail of the distribution, because if consumers are sure to receive a rebate, the rebate program is a decrease in price for these consumers. I find a positive point estimate for the fifth percentile, but the estimate is too noisy in the tail of the distribution to be statistically different from zero.
An RD-DDD Design to Estimate ATE
In general, regression discontinuity designs require relatively weak identification assumptions to estimate local average treatment effects (LATE). I can obtain consistent estimates as long as the conditional expectation of the error term is smooth at the cutoff of the running variable Let y its be electricity consumption for household i, billing month t, and data set s = {1, 2}.
Define the treatment group in the first data set by D its = D it · 1{s = 1}. Pooling the first and second data sets, I estimate:
α is the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimate of the program's average treatment effect (ATE). The basic idea behind this approach is that I can estimate g(x i ) · D t by using the assumption that the growth pattern of consumption is common to households that opened an account on a certain date and those that opened their account on the exactly same date in the year before. by using the data of the placebo groups. I control for shocks specific to households in the main data set by using the data of the control group. As a result, the estimation provides the ATE for the treatment group given my identification assumptions earlier than my RD sample. Table 7 In columns 2 through 6, I include increasingly many treatment groups in the regression.
For example, column 6 includes households that have been at the same address for four years or less. Overall, I find that the point estimates of the ATE are slightly larger in absolute value by about 0.001 to 0.01 percentage points. However, the differences between the ATE and LATE are not statistically significant. This means that the program's treatment effect is a 4% to 6% reduction in consumption, both for the RD samples and the samples that have been at the same address longer than the RD samples.
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5 Policy Implications
Cost-Effectiveness of the Program
In the literature, evaluation of energy conservation programs usually report two cost-effective measures: 1) program cost per unit of energy saved and and 2) program cost per ton of emissions abated (Joskow and Marron, 1992; Boomhower and Davis, 2013) . Although these measures are not direct measures of welfare, they provide a valuable starting point and are widely used in policy discussions. I first provide these measures and discuss welfare implications in the next section.
In Table 8 , I provide the program's cost-effectiveness based on my RD estimates of the effect of rebate incentives on energy conservation.
14 First, I calculate the direct program cost for rebate payment, which is the total amount of rebate paid to consumers. Note that this direct cost does not include indirect costs such as expenses for administration and advertisement. Second, I calculate the reduction in electricity usage based on my RD estimates. Third, I translate this reduction into the reduction in carbon emissions by using the average carbon intensity of electricity consumed in California, which is 0.9 lb. per kWh in California Air Resources Board (2011). Finally, I obtain the program cost per unit of electricity saved and the cost per ton of carbon emissions abated.
The results provide important policy implications. First, the cost-effectiveness differs substantially between the coastal and inland areas. In the coastal areas, the program is a very expensive way to reduce electricity usage. This is because the program did not induce significant reductions in usage, although it paid substantial rebates for consumers who One important caveat is that the California 20/20 rebate program provided a rebate for consumers based on their monthly electricity consumption. The marginal cost of electricity is generally higher in peak hours and lower in off-peak hours. If the reductions mostly come from peak hour usage, the benefit comes not only from reductions in emissions but also from savings of relatively high marginal cost of electricity. In this case, the cost-effectiveness would be better than my calculation. On the other hand, if the reduction mostly comes from off-peak usage, the cost-effectiveness would be worse than my calculation. From monthly billing data, one cannot quantify how many reductions come from peak and off-peak hours.
Implications for Welfare
The high cost-effectiveness ratio found in the previous section does not necessarily mean that the program is not welfare-improving, because the rebate expense can be thought as a transfer between consumers. The regulated electric utilities that administered the rebate program passed through the cost to consumers by increasing electricity price afterwords.
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That is, the rebate expense is a transfer from rebated consumers to all consumers after the program's treatment period.
Consider two simple cases. Suppose that consumers pay a linear electricity price that is lower than the social marginal cost of electricity. In this case, the rebate program can be welfare-improving even if there is zero treatment effect. The rebate expense slightly increases electricity price afterwords and it can improve welfare if the new price is closer to the social marginal cost of electricity. Conversely, if consumers pay a linear electricity price that is higher than the social marginal cost of electricity, the rebate program is likely to lower welfare because there is a more price distortion after the rebate expense increases electricity price.
What complicates the welfare analysis of the California 20/20 program is the increasing block pricing (Borenstein, 2012; Ito, Forthcoming) , where the marginal price of electricity is an increasing step function of monthly consumption. That is, consumers pay higher marginal price when they consume more during their billing month. In 2005 and 2006, the marginal 15 Most utility conservation programs in the US recover the cost by increasing electricity price. This is a notable difference from the energy-efficient appliance replacement program in Mexico (Boomhower and Davis, 2013) , where the cost was paid by the tax revenue prices for the first to fourth tiers were 12, 14, 17, and 20 cents per kWh. The key question is, what is the social marginal cost of electricity. I have to make two assumptions to provide an estimate of the social marginal cost. First, suppose that the long-run private marginal cost of electricity is equal to the average cost of electricity under the existing tariff schedule.
Then, the private marginal cost is 13.37 cents per kWh for SCE in 2005. Second, suppose that the externality from carbon emissions is 0.95 cents per kWh. This estimate comes from the assumptions that 1) the social marginal cost of ton of carbon emissions equals $21 according to Greenstone, Kopits and Wolverton (2011) and 2) the average carbon intensity of electricity consumed is 0.9 lb. per kWh according to California Air Resources Board (2011).
Then, the social marginal cost of electricity is 14.32 cents per kWh for SCE in 2005.
In the billing data, about a half of consumers are in the first and second tiers and the other half of consumers are in the third and fourth tiers. That is, a half of consumer pay slightly lower marginal prices relative to the social marginal cost, while the other half pay significantly higher marginal prices relative to the social marginal cost. In theory, there is the possibility that the rebate program can improve welfare if the cost is recovered from the two lower tiers.
However, in practice, California electric utilities have taken the opposite approach when they recovered the cost, because of a regulatory constraint. After the California electricity crisis, regulators and state legislators were concerned about the impact of price increases on lower income households. As a result, the first two tiers were virtually frozen. In fact, SCE increased only the third and fourth tier rates in 2006 (from 17 to 23 and from 20 to 32 cents), while it did not change the first and second tier rates. Therefore, it is hard to argue that it is welfare-improving unless the externality of electricity is much larger than the one that is used in my analysis.
Conclusion
Many countries use substantial public funds to subsidize reductions in negative externalities.
However, such subsidies create asymmetric incentives because increases in externalities remain unpriced. In this paper, I study implications of such asymmetric subsidy incentives by applying a regression discontinuity design for the California 20/20 electricity rebate program.
Using household-level panel data from administrative records, I find precisely-estimated zero causal effects in coastal areas. In contrast, the incentive produced a 5% consumption reduction in inland areas. Income and climate conditions significantly drive the heterogeneity.
Asymmetric subsidy structures weaken incentives because consumers far from the rebate target show little response.
My findings provide several important policy implications. First, the asymmetric incentive structure of subsidy programs is likely to weaken incentives to reduce negative externalities. Second, the difference between my RD estimates and naive estimates of the treatment effect shows that the additionality problem is important in evaluation of similar subsidy programs. Finally, the overall program cost is 17.5 cents per kWh reduction and $390 per ton of carbon dioxide reduction, which is unlikely to be cost-effective for a reasonable range of the social marginal cost of electricity.
The evidence of the heterogeneity in the treatment effect suggests that one way to improve the cost-effectiveness is to target lower-income households and households in areas with high summer temperature, because these households are more likely to respond to the subsidy incentive. Another point that can be improved is that the program should target only peakhour consumption if the primary goal is to reduce high marginal costs of electricity in peakhours. In 2005, regulators had no choice because California residents had conventional meters that recorded only monthly consumption. Recently, a growing number of consumers in many countries gain access to smart meters that record real-time consumption. This technology makes it possible to target consumption in particular time periods (Wolak, 2010; Ito, Ida and Tanaka, 2013; Jessoe and Rapson, Forthcoming) . However, the fundamental problems that I find in this paper remain the same if regulators continue to provide asymmetric subsidy incentives that subsidize reductions in usage but do not tax increases in usage. Note: This figure presents the RD estimates of the difference in log consumption between the treatment and control groups. Household fixed effects are subtracted by using consumption data before January 2005. I use a 90-day bandwidth and quadratic controls for the trend of the running variable, which is the same specification as my main estimation result in Table 3 . Note: This table presents the RD estimates of the effect of rebate incentives on energy conservation. The dependent variable is the log of electricity consumption. I estimate (2) with a 90-day bandwidth and quadratic controls for the trend in the running variable. Standard errors are clustered at the household level to adjust for serial correlation. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. This table presents RD estimates with different bandwidth choices and alternative controls for the running variable. The dependent variable is the log of electricity consumption. Standard errors are clustered at the household level to adjust for serial correlation. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. This table presents the RD estimates of the effect of rebate incentives on energy conservation interacted with income and climate conditions. The dependent variable is the log of electricity consumption. I use a 90-day bandwidth and quadratic controls for the trend in the running variable. Standard errors are clustered at the household level to adjust for serial correlation. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.. This table presents the quantile RD estimates of the effect of rebate incentives on energy conservation interacted with income and climate conditions. The dependent variable is the change in the log of electricity consumption from 2004 to 2005. I use a 90-day bandwidth and quadratic controls for the trend in the running variable. Standard errors are clustered at the household level to adjust for serial correlation. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. This table presents the RD-DDD estimates of the effect of rebate incentives on energy conservation for inland climate zones. Given the identification assumptions described in the main text, this estimation produces the average treatment effect (ATE) for the samples included in each estimation. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. In SDG&E, the vast majority of consumers live in coastal areas. The dependent variable is log of electricity consumption. I use the 90-day bandwidth and quadratic controls for the trend in the running variable. Standard errors are clustered at the household level to adjust for serial correlation. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance respectively.
